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large diversified business groups have an increased incentive to restructure (refocus) so as not to incur excessive organization costs. We offer a number of propositions regarding factors that might hinder or spark a business group to respond to the underlying incentive to refocus its business portfolio.
In particular, we provide an overview of external factors, including external shocks, external control mechanisms, variance in country policy toward institutional development, market power and competition, and cultural factors. The discussion of these external factors will help to clarify the potential variations in the level of business group refocusing due to differences in environmental factors (Boisot & Child, 1996) . We also examine internal factors that may affect the timing or likelihood of refocusing, including poor performance, leadership issues, and organizational culture and trust.
Finally, we examine how different ownership arrangements might affect the direction of refocusing. Although most prior empirical work has considered the business group as a homogeneous organizational form, this assumption has serious limitations. For example, prior research has identified significant variations in business group ownership, including dominant family, bank, and government ownership positions, as well as groups partly controlled by nonbank financial institutions or foreign ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) . Family ownership of diversified business groups is prominent in many emerging economies across Latin America (Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 2004) , Taiwan (Chung, 2001) , India (Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002) , and elsewhere. Banks with a strong ownership position in a business group are often found in those countries whose capital markets are not fully developed, such as the Philippines (Unite & Sullivan, 2003) . Other business groups are partly controlled by developmental financial institutions (e.g., George & Prabhu, 2000) . Partial foreign ownership of groups can take place through investment by large international firms engaging in foreign direct investment. Unlike banks or families that have an ownership stake in business groups, foreign owners are usually less embedded in the social network of the group. In contrast, governments often play a more central role in emerging countries through their ownership interests in local business groups (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003) . We offer propositions regarding how these ownership positions might influence the direction and type of refocusing undertaken and their impact on overall organizational costs.
Background

Corporate Restructuring and Refocusing
Corporate restructuring has been a very popular strategy during the past 25 years. The impact of these activities has been felt in almost every sector of the U.S. and European economies. Corporate restructuring encompasses multiple forms of change that we can separate into three categories: asset restructuring, financial restructuring, and organizational restructuring (Johnson, 1996) . Asset restructuring involves the sale or spin-off of businesses within the corporate portfolio leading to a refocused (predominantly lower) level of diversification (Markides, 1996) . Financial restructuring encompasses leveraged buyouts (LBOs), stock repurchases, and leveraged recapitalizations, whereas organizational restructuring entails reorganizations within the firm that do not involve the sale or disposal of assets.
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In the current study, we are examining corporate refocusing. Corporate refocusing (Johnson, 1996) , downscoping (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994) , and dediversification (Markides, 1996) describe activities designed to reduce the number of businesses within the firm. This reduction in the businesses within the portfolio often involves a change in corporate diversification strategy (Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992) . For example, the sale or spin-off of multiple businesses may lead to a new portfolio that emphasizes a set of related or unrelated businesses. Thus, corporate refocusing represents asset restructuring that leads to a smaller firm with a concomitant change in diversification strategy (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994) .
Emerging Economies and Corporate Refocusing
Emerging economies constitute about 20% of the global economy and 80% of the world's population today. This group of countries has been receiving growing attention in the past two decades because of their increasing share in world trade and foreign direct investment and their rising numbers owing to the collapse of the socialist system around the world (London & Hart, 2004) . There is no uniform classification of countries as emerging economies, however. The term emerging economies originated from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, in the early 1980s to distinguish those middle-income emerging markets where foreign financial institutions were allowed to buy securities. In recent years, the meaning of emerging economies has expanded to countries that were previously labeled as developing countries. According to recent World Bank classifications, emerging economies in 2003 fell in the gross national income (GNI) range of $756 to $9,265 per capita (World Bank, 2004) . Because this relatively broad income classification includes some countries with little economic progress and others with inefficient socialist economic systems, researchers tend to include additional qualifications when they study firm strategies in emerging economies.
Emerging market economies from an institutional theory point of view are characterized by government policies promoting the development of market-friendly institutions and by accompanying relatively fast economic growth rates (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al. 2005) . Although there are substantial differences in the backgrounds of emerging economies, such as those of China, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, and Thailand, there are important similarities in their recent institutional development. According to neo-institutional economists, institutions in general are "the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies" (North, 1990: 107) . By building well-functioning market institutions, emerging economies may be able to reduce their market imperfections and lower their cost of transacting (North, 1990) .
Emerging economies traditionally suffer from deficiencies in areas such as transportation and telecommunications (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) , making it more costly for firms in those economies to transact with other firms. As a result of inefficient distribution systems, import restrictions, and a lack of necessary capital, key raw materials are often unavailable to firms. In addition, necessary human resources, such as competent research scientists or well-trained managers, are typically in short supply because of underdeveloped systems of education. The aforementioned factors all contribute to increased transaction costs faced by firms.
Besides this lack of basic factor resources, the underdevelopment of necessary market institutions greatly affects local firms conducting business in emerging economies (Wan, 2005) . Missing market institutions in these countries can include transparency in economic reporting; a stable currency; a stable government; liquid, well-functioning equity and lending markets to fuel expansion and growth (cf. Hoskisson, Johnson, Yiu, & Wan, 2001) ; and a strong legal system to provide aggressive enforcement of property rights and a brake on opportunism, graft, and corruption (Devlin, Grafton, & Rowlands, 1998) .
As emerging economies develop better market institutions, the cost of transacting may drop substantially. Lower levels of transaction costs coupled with reduced uncertainty provide several advantages for local firms. Local firms in general may be able to benefit from improved access to capital and other resources. Clearer ownership structures and improved capital market allocation open the doors to foreign direct investment. At the same time, however, institutional reforms may present new threats to local firms in emerging economies. Frequent changes in government policies are a general source of environmental uncertainty (Ramamurti, 2000) . Governments in emerging economies, for instance, tend to implement extensive privatization policies, leading to an inflow of new competitors and widespread financial distress for firms that are unwilling or unable to change (Megginson & Netter, 2001 ). Thus, although the overall level of transaction costs may be lower as market institutions develop, the increased number of entrants likely results in increased competition for local firms.
Although emerging economies appear to present dynamic environmental conditions for all local firms, the propensity to refocus in this setting may be different among local firms owing to differences in their ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1999) . Firms in emerging economies, for example, are often parts of diversified business groups. Recent research indicates that, when faced with environmental challenges, business groups' refocusing responses may differ from those of independent firms (Hoskisson, Cannella, et al., 2004) . We argue that the refocusing of business groups in emerging economies represents a unique trade-off between transaction and organizational costs. To fully understand business group refocusing, we must first examine the origins of business groups and their role in emerging economies.
Emerging Economies and the Role of Diversified Business Groups
Business groups are the dominant form of business organization in many emerging economies (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2000) . For instance, the largest 2,800 business groups in the People's Republic of China contribute approximately 60% of China's industrial output (State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China, 2000) . In Korea, the 30 largest business groups comprise 40% of the country's economic activity (Chang & Hong, 2000) . Three major discipline-based explanations have been given as to why business groups are so prevalent in emerging economies. These are the political economy, the sociological, and the economic viewpoints.
The political economy viewpoint emphasizes the role of government in establishing business groups. This view suggests that governments can actively encourage the formation of business groups by providing access to capital such as loan guarantees in order to facilitate economic development (Amsden, 1989; Guillén, 2000) . Governments can also passively encourage business group formation when high levels of government corruption are present. In such circumstances, businesses with preferential access to government officials may find it lucrative to diversify in order to leverage government favor across multiple industries (Evans, 1979; Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998) .
The explanation of business groups by economic sociologists highlights the importance of interpersonal relationships (Strachan, 1976) . According to this perspective, business groups are "collections of firms bound together in some formal and/or informal ways" (Granovetter, 1994: 454) . Much of the work in this stream has suggested that business groups grew somewhat naturally out of family, clan, and other interpersonal relationships. For example, Fields (1995) studied the similarity between business groups and extended families, complete with patriarchs, inheritance rules, and mechanisms of discipline and control. More recently, Keister's (1998) research focused on the ability of interlocking boards of directors among group-affiliated firms to facilitate information flow within Chinese groups.
The third view of business groups is based on institutional economics (e.g., Leff, 1976 Leff, , 1978 . According to this view, firms seek to overcome deficiencies in emerging economy resource markets and institutional frameworks by banding together into diversified business groups. Such business groups can provide internal capital, labor, material, and technology markets, allowing their member firms to transact more efficiently (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 1997 . Lacking a strong external capital market in emerging economies, large businesses in more mature industries often lack a satisfactory mechanism to invest their cash in additional rent-generating activities. At the same time, smaller firms in rapidly growing industries have difficulty in obtaining the necessary funding needed to develop new products and to extend into new markets. However, when both the mature and the growing firm are placed together under the umbrella of a business group, the more mature firm can provide the capital needed by the smaller firm (Guillén, 2000) . Such cross-subsidies can boost the overall performance of business group-affiliated firms.
In contrast to research on refocusing in developed economies, empirical research on business group refocusing in emerging economies tends to highlight the impacts of external forces, including institutional changes (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2001) . In a study of business group refocusing in French civil law countries (which included emerging as well as developed country business groups), Hoskisson, Cannella, and colleagues (2004) found that deregulation and increased competition led to increasing levels of refocusing among independent firms but decreasing levels of refocusing among group-affiliated firms. The authors also reported that increased country development led to significantly more refocusing among group-affiliated than among independent firms. Although many of the institutional and economic challenges that contributed to the preeminence of the business group continue to exist to a substantial degree, most emerging economies have made substantial improvements in their economic systems during the past several decades (Hoskisson et al., 2000) . Paradoxically, these improvements have often been detrimental to the performance of business groups because previous market-substitute mecha-nisms internal to business groups have become unnecessary or outdated. For example, Khanna and Palepu (2000) , in studying business groups in Chile, found that, as market institutions developed, business group affiliation performance benefits "atrophied" over time. As a result of these external pressures, business groups have become increasingly involved in refocusing activities (Hoskisson et al., 2001 ). In the following section, we develop a framework in which the refocusing of emerging economy business groups is explained as an attempt to balance transaction and organizational costs, to achieve an appropriate balance of diversification within the group, and to facilitate overall business group performance.
Institutional Changes and Diversified Business Groups
One of the most significant changes taking place in emerging economies is the changing role of government intervention. Governments of most emerging economies in recent years have started to liberalize foreign trade and foreign direct investment (Sougata, 2003) . Such liberalization typically diminishes the asymmetries in foreign trade and direct investment, exposes local firms to foreign competition, and decreases the ability of local firms to obtain preferential government treatment (Guillén, 2000) . In addition to trade liberalization, widespread privatizations have been implemented in many countries to further improve economic efficiency (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Ramamurti, 2000) . The increased opportunities presented by developing market institutions, on one hand, and the growing environmental complexity that has resulted from greater competition, decreased government involvement, and private owners, on the other hand, have provided incentives to local firms in emerging economies to refocus their operations (Guillén, 2000) . When institutions change in emerging economies, refocusing on a set of core businesses may be appropriate for groups to sustain their collective competitive advantage.
We argue that institutional changes focusing on market development affect the overall transaction costs in an economy as well as the organization costs experienced by business groups. The notion of institutional change provided by neo-institutional economists is particularly pertinent in considering the underlying level of overall transaction costs as markets develop in emerging economies. North (1990) suggested that the overall costs of transactions in an economy exhibit a significant sensitivity to the market institutions in a country's environment. Such institutions constitute constraints as well as incentives for economic actors in their market exchange (Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005) . If legal infrastructure is not in place to protect contractual relationships, transaction costs may be high, and firms will be less likely to engage in economic transactions. Under these conditions, business groups may act as substitute mechanisms for missing market institutions, including government bureaucracy (Keefer & Knack, 1997) , legal enforcement (Clague, 1997) , and societal trust levels (Fukuyama, 1995) . If, however, intellectual and property rights protections improve; capital, labor, and product markets mature; and market intermediaries arise, business groups become less important. Under these conditions, business group refocusing may become a distinct possibility. Ultimately, this would mean that the scope of business groups' diversification would be reduced, potentially leading to increased efficiency (Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Hong, 2004) .
Similarly, a diversified business group would experience different organizational costs depending on the level of diversification (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987) . The inner workings of a business group typically resemble the multidivisional (M-form) structure (Chu, 2001 ). The M-form structure, which facilitates the span of control for managing a set of diversified businesses, is characterized by a central corporate office and semiautonomous divisions or subsidiaries (Williamson, 1975) . The M-form structure has more hierarchical control and coordination than holding company forms involving legally independent firms. Thus, the organizational challenges for managing diversified business groups might be similar to those facing diversified M-form firms in that organization costs would increase as the number of affiliated firms increases.
The proposed relationships between business group diversification and transaction and organizational costs are illustrated in Figure 1 . The downward-sloping transaction cost curve (TC 1 ) represents the overall transaction costs in an economy produced by the legal infrastructure and the available market institutions. The upward-sloping curve (OC 1 ) represents the average organizational costs in a country that a diversified business group experiences to conduct internal transactions. The overall cost from the given set of market institutions would be realized at the intersection of the transaction cost and organizational cost curves, where the combined transaction and organization costs are the lowest. Thus, the overall optimal combined transaction and organization costs would be realized at Point A in Figure 1 . This would be the set point for the average level of diversification based on these costs for business groups in an emerging economy.
Institutional Transition, Transaction Costs, and Pressure to Refocus
As Figure 2 illustrates, when market institutions have evolved such that there is better legal protection for transactions, more capital available in the market, better financial intermediaries, and a more developed product market, overall transaction costs are lowered in the emerging economy. This lower level of transaction costs is illustrated by curve TC 2 . The new lower overall transaction cost level decreases the need for internal group markets and broad levels of diversification in diversified business groups. As such, the optimal level of diversification in the overall economy would be lowered for these business groups (Point B). Accordingly, there would be an incentive for refocusing to lower the level of diversification. In effect, the large unrelated diversified business groups would no longer be as necessary as substitutes for market institutions. Thus, the continued development of institutions exerts pressure on large business groups to reduce their levels of diversification.
External and Internal Factors That Influence Refocusing Activity
Although lower overall transaction costs create an incentive to refocus, business groups may not initiate refocusing immediately. Several important external and internal factors can trigger the refocusing decisions of business groups. We explain below the most relevant exter-
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nal and internal circumstances that may either lead groups to initiate or may hinder refocusing. External factors include (a) external shocks, (b) external control mechanisms, (c) variance in country policy toward developing market-oriented institutions, (d) market power and competition, and (e) country cultural factors. Internal factors include (a) poor performance, (b) leadership, and (c) organizational culture and trust. We discuss the importance of these factors below and develop propositions to summarize the logic offered.
External Shocks
The need for refocusing of business groups may not only be due to institutional changes such as the development of more market-based systems in emerging economies. Various shocks or crisis events in many emerging economies have dramatically increased the pressure for business groups to refocus (Khanna & Palepu, 1999) . For example, the Asian currency crisis that began in 1997 (Haggard, 2001 ) and the decline of the Soviet Union and its move toward market reforms (cf. Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000) have all affected refocusing in various ways.
Although the Asian financial crisis began in 1997, its aftereffects are still present and encourage reform (Haggard, 2001) . The crisis itself led to dramatic decreases in currency valuation even in resilient economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore. As currency values fell, so did the value of corporations operating in these countries (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2001 ). Likewise, unemployment rose and currency reserves fell. The decline made it very clear that there were widespread problems with macroeconomic institutions, ineffective firm strategies, and mismanagement. There can be no question that profound structural changes are taking place in Southeast Asia today. Increases in foreign competition from China and India, the presence of global competitors, and the recent deregulation of many sectors in the economy have led to the need to adapt to these new environmental contexts through refocusing to new business models that are more effective. However, it has taken the currency crisis to spark refocusing in many firms in Southeast Asia.
Proposition 1: Business groups operating in countries with macroeconomic shocks will be more likely to refocus than business groups operating in countries without macroeconomic shocks.
External Control Mechanisms
One fundamental difference between firms operating in developed market economies and firms operating in emerging economies is the lack of external control mechanisms to discipline inefficient managers in the latter. The market for corporate control is not developed to the extent that it can help to resolve inefficiencies. Thus, takeovers are largely absent in many emerging economies (although this is beginning to change). This is important because research in developed economies suggests that takeovers can spark refocusing activities (Berger & Ofek, 1999) .
Part of the reason the market for corporate control is less active is the high degree of political power retained by large business groups. This may lead to government protection from takeover attempts. Second, shareholder rights have not been protected to the extent necessary to facilitate change. Accordingly, shareholders may worry about losses in such exchanges. Third, the market for corporate control is an adversarial process characterized by winners and losers, conflict, and loss of face. In societies such as those in Southeast Asia that emphasize harmony, reciprocity, and the preservation of face, adversarial processes are often ignored or shunned (Carney, 2004) . The lack of an active market for corporate control, adequate shareholder protection, and cultural biases against adversarial processes serve to reduce the amount of refocusing and may help entrench managers of business groups (Bruton et al., 2001; Filatotchev et al., 2000) .
Proposition 2: Business groups operating in countries with a more active takeover market will be more likely to refocus than business groups operating in countries with a less active takeover market.
Variance in Country Policy Toward Developing Market-Oriented Institutions
One of the primary objectives for economic reform in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China was to increase productivity by dismantling the centrally planned economies present in those countries (Filatotchev et al., 2000) . Through the use of large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises, local governments hoped that such removal of major constraints on managerial action coupled with improved managerial incentives would allow widespread refocusing of newly privatized firms. However, there have been significant variations among the privatization policies of different countries owing to their path-dependent institutional development (Boisot & Child, 1996; Nee, 1992; Xin & Pearce, 1996) .
In the case of Russia, the centralized planning system was replaced through mass privatization by means of vouchers issued to all adult citizens. As government ownership declined, decision making and overall control of independent firms became decentralized (Filatotchev et al., 2000) . In China, however, control is still very centralized despite the privatization process (Carney, 2004) . Part of the reason for this may be political; Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are burdened with social welfare responsibilities. As such, the difficulty in implementing a large-scale privatization program is seriously undermined by the role of the state in economic exchange. However, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argued that in transition economies, where weak institutions fail to support economic growth, a strong central government could play an important role. Accordingly, the refocusing that has taken place in China has been more orderly, with less employment displacement.
Alternatively, much of the refocusing activity in Russia has involved downsizing (e.g., layoffs) (Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Filatotchev et al., 2000) . Given that most of the firms are either single-business or vertically integrated firms, widespread asset refocusing through selloffs is not entirely feasible. The lack of institutional development and resulting limited foreign investment are hindering change in Russia (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004) . Filatotchev and colleagues (2000) found that financial institutional shareholdings were positively related to downsizing, but managerial ownership was negatively related. Their results suggested that managerial ownership is serving to entrench management potentially to the detriment of firm productivity.
Research has suggested that privatization, on average, is positively related to refocusing (Djankov & Murrell, 2002) . Djankov and Murrell (2002) evaluated more than 100 studies in a meta-analysis on privatization and reported that increased private ownership leads to more refocusing. Interestingly, results for privatization in the Commonwealth of Independent States (those states formerly associated with the Soviet Union) are insignificant, whereas results in Southeast Asia have been positive. They also found that state ownership in traditional stateowned enterprises is less effective than all other ownership types except worker owners in promoting refocusing. Therefore, the level of privatization may affect the degree of business group refocusing.
Proposition 3: Business groups operating in countries that implemented mass privatization policies will be more likely to refocus than business groups operating in countries that implemented gradual privatization policies.
Market Power and Competition
Another factor that can influence the decision of whether to undertake refocusing activity is the degree of market power the business group has. As noted by Carney (2004) , macroinstitutional change often involves distributional struggles (such as potential entry into a particular market space) that mobilize coalitions of actors to defend their shared interests. In the case of Southeast Asia, business groups often form an elite group of politically connected firms that may have the power to perpetuate their positions in the face of increased deregulation and competition (Carney, 2004; Haggard, 2001) . Thus, business groups may be able to forestall refocusing activity, relative to independent firms (Hoskisson, Cannella, et al. 2004) when faced with deregulation and increased competition from both foreign and domestic firms (Kim et al., 2004) . Independent firms may not benefit from the same level of market power, political connectedness, or the support of a group of businesses that reduce business risk (Tan & See, 2004) .
Proposition 4: More powerful business groups will generally be slower to refocus than less powerful business groups or independent firms.
Country Cultural Factors
One of the principal external factors that may affect refocusing in emerging economies is cultural differences. For example, Southeast Asian and U.S. firms operate under two different basic cultural models. In the United States, the prevailing culture is one of confrontation. Examples include the active market for corporate control, willingness to dismiss CEOs, and downsizing. Alternatively, firms in Southeast Asian countries operate more within a context of consensus or cooperation. Preservation of face, harmony, reciprocity, and decision making based on consensus require different sets of rules and relationships (Xin & Pearce, 1996) . In effect, the prevailing culture fosters the use of relational norms or contracting that serve as a substitute for market-based forces (Nee, 1992) . Tan, Luo, and Zhang (1998) argued that fear of failure may lead to less risk taking and avoidance of uncertainty. A culture that does not support risk taking or market-based forces may experience less proactive change.
Interestingly, these cultural differences may be changing over time. Fisher, Lee, and Johns (2004) examined business turnarounds in Australia and Singapore, dismissal of the CEO, and ownership change and found that as the regulatory climate and market institutions improved, cultural differences did not have the same impact they did prior to the aforementioned improvements. This suggests that less-developed economies may adopt refocusing strategies more similar to Western countries as their institutional infrastructures advance.
Proposition 5: Business groups operating within countries that emphasize relational norms or contracting will be less likely to refocus than business groups operating in countries that do not emphasize relational norms.
Poor Performance
As noted above, there are a number of internal factors that may lead to refocusing. Prior research in developed economies (Johnson, 1996) has suggested that poor performance may be one such factor. This may occur directly, as happened following the Asian financial crisis when groups in many of the affected countries came under strong pressure to refocus their operations to improve performance (Haggard, 2001) . Alternatively, poor performance may indirectly result in refocusing, such as when it leads to a takeover attempt and a firm refocuses to try to avoid the takeover (Markides, 1996) .
Proposition 6: Business groups exhibiting poor performance are more likely to refocus than business groups exhibiting strong performance.
Changes in Leadership
Poor performance may also lead indirectly to a leadership change and to subsequent refocusing. Bruton and colleagues (2001) have noted that poor performance in Asian firms has led to increased CEO dismissal. The new CEO, then, is more likely to undertake refocusing efforts to stem the decline in performance. When market institutions have evolved and overall transaction costs are lowered in the country economy, a leadership change may more readily allow a firm to respond to the pressure for reducing level of diversification. In this regard, as noted earlier, privatization through voucher or "giveaway" schemes is highly unlikely to influence strong changes if the leadership in the organization follows the mentality from the previous central planning regime (Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003) . In an emerging economy, because a change in mind-set may be necessary, a change in leadership can be important to trigger appropriate refocusing activities. Recently, Berger and Ofek (1999) found that refocusing in developed economies was much more likely, relative to a control group of firms, when there was top management (CEO) turnover. As a result, a change in leadership can be important to trigger appropriate refocusing activities.
Proposition 7: Business groups with higher top management team turnover are more likely to refocus than business groups with low levels of top management team turnover.
Level of Organizational Trust
The level of organizational trust may be another important internal predictor of refocusing activity (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995) . Relational contracting refers to personalized exchanges governed by tacit commitments that serve to maintain the continuing relationship (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) . Components of relational contracting are present in reputation (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) , social capital (Uzzi, 1997) , and guanxi (Xin & Pearce, 1996) . Relational norms and contracting are generally fostered by trust between firms, groups, and individuals (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) . Empirical evidence demonstrates that in some social settings, humans exhibit trustworthy behavior (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995) . As noted by Bromiley and Cummings, the presence of trust within the organization may serve to reduce transaction costs. Specifically, internal costs related to monitoring, enforcement, comprehensive contracts, and control systems may be reduced.
Within the context of business groups in emerging economies, one can make a similar argument. With increased trust, the costs of controlling multiple businesses in the business group and the costs of making, monitoring, and enforcing implicit and explicit contracts within the business group should be reduced. Therefore, firms with higher levels of trust within the organization may operate with an organizational culture characterized as having lower organizational costs. Conversely, business groups operating with a culture of lower trust would exhibit higher organizational costs. Thus, if these organizational costs (internal costs) are greater than the transaction costs associated with market-based transactions (external costs), then it may be more efficient to refocus the business group.
Proposition 8: Business groups that exhibit lower levels of trust are more likely to refocus than business groups exhibiting higher levels of trust.
Ownership Influences and the Outcomes of Refocusing
Once a decision is made to refocus, the outcome of refocusing activity is shaped by the interests of dominant owners. For example, owners are likely to have a strong influence on the type of diversification strategy and associated organization structure that would be implemented. Two dominant forms of strategy we will consider here are unrelated and related diversification strategies. The most efficient organizational structure associated with the unrelated diversified strategy is the competitive M-form structure, whereas the related diversified strategy is most efficiently paired with the cooperative M-form structure (Hoskisson, Hill, & Kim, 1993) . Competitive M-form organizations are characterized by significant divisional auton-omy and accompanying decentralization of strategic control such that divisional managers are accountable for division performance. As such, the evaluation of divisions is primarily based on objective financial criteria, and cash flow is allocated among divisions from headquarters on a competitive basis.
Alternatively, in firms using the cooperative M-form structure, coordination between divisions is necessary to realize economies of scope through transferring skills and sharing resources among divisions (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992) . Coordination between divisions is facilitated through incentive systems of divisional managers, which are linked to corporate, or group, as well as divisional performance. Markides and Williamson (1996) found that the cooperative M-form is more effective than the competitive M-form at realizing synergies inherent in related diversification. However, the cooperative M-form is more expensive to manage and thus, as firms move toward relatedness in the cooperative M-form structure, they experience increased organizational costs (Jones & Hill, 1988) .
For instance, Kim and colleagues (2004) outlined two large Korean chaebols' (LG and Hyundai) refocusing efforts in response to improved institutional infrastructure.
LG reduced its size as well as its level of diversification (although it still has a large unrelated component) and pursued a competitive M-form structure. Alternatively, Hyundai Motor Group sold off businesses and refocused into a related-diversified group of firms similar to a cooperative Mform.
If, as our model suggests, business groups decide to employ more focused strategies such as related diversification or vertical integration, then new organizational structures would be required. As the M-form literature suggests, more cooperative M-form structures would be necessary (Hill et al., 1992) . Concomitantly, this would drive up organizational costs in order to facilitate coordination between related businesses in diversified business groups. We illustrate this condition in Figure 3 . The increase in organizational costs to implement more cooperative M-form structures in business groups is represented by curve OC 2 .
Various ownership structures may provide incentives or disincentives to focus on one or the other of these diversification strategies and structural positions and thus may influence the nature of the refocusing taken by a particular business group. Much of the previous research from developed economies has classified basic ownership patterns into two groups, inside manager-dominated groups and outside owner-dominated groups. This same research has also suggested that one or the other ownership structure tends to dominate the decision making regarding refocusing (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990 ). However, these prior studies may underestimate the different incentives associated with a larger variety of ownership groups. This is especially true for the different ownership patterns associated with business groups in emerging economies (Ramaswamy et al., 2002) . Even in the context of the United States or other more developed countries, research has demonstrated that different owners are related to different corporate-level strategies (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002) .
In the finance literature, Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) have likewise developed a three-part classification of owners in the United States. Pressure-sensitive owners are susceptible to the influences of power exercised by firm managers. However, pressure-resistant owners tend to have clear profit and growth objectives for the firm, relatively independent from the goals of the firm's management. The group of pressure-indeterminate owners plays a passive role in some situations and a marginally active role in others. David and colleagues (1998) suggested that mutual and pension fund investors are pressure-resistant in that they can intervene in decision making "without fear of retribution." However, banks cannot easily follow the same course because much of their income is tied to interest derived from lending to target firms (Hoskisson et al., 2002) . Thus, type of owner as well as amount of ownership will be important considerations in examining the motivation of owners in business groups refocusing in emerging economies. We offer propositions regarding the different incentives of owners concerning the desired type of refocusing as depicted in Figure 4 .
Family Ownership
Dominant family ownership of a business group often implies control by an extended family even if they do not own a 50% majority (Chang, 2003; Chung, 2001; Ramaswamy et al., 2002) . For example, Malaysian-based YTL Corporation was founded in the 1920s as a timber business. Today the firm is run by the grandson of the founder and includes real estate, power generation, and information technology businesses (Kennedy, 2002) . In groups with a strong family ownership position, the descendants of group founders control group-affiliated firms through both equity stakes and complex legal structures (Chang, 2003) . In such groups, it is common for each of the group affiliates to be led by a different family member.
Similar to research on emerging markets, research by Palmer, Friedland, Jennings, and Powers (1987) suggests that large diversified corporations in the U.S. context are much slower 
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to adopt decentralized strategies for fear of losing power or hierarchical control. Accordingly, their research indicates that family-owned firms were less likely to adopt the multidivisional structure, which became prominent in the 1950s and 1960s among large U.S. corporations. Similarly, large diversified business groups in emerging economies such as Korea have maintained family control and usually more centralized control of operations even though the groups were quite diversified (Kim et al., 2004) . Chang (2003) suggested that concentrated ownership may create an incentive for the family owners to expropriate wealth from the subsidiary businesses of a large diversified business group. Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) suggested that the relationship between ownership and wealth appropriation may be attributable to "tunneling." This refers to transferring resources from firms in which a controlling family holds relatively small cash flow rights to a business group subsidiary in which the family owns substantial cash flow rights. In this way, firms can expropriate value from minority shareholders (Bergstrom & Rydqvist, 1990) . In business groups in emerging economies, it is likely that the refocusing choice would be a very constrained type of diversification such as related constrained or vertical integration. Through strategies such as vertical integration, where there are significant internal sales to the business group, transfer-pricing strategies can be employed that may facilitate tunneling. In fact, Chang's (2003) research suggests that performance drives ownership and not the other way around. In other words, families pursue ownership in firms that are highly profitable inside the business group, ostensibly to allow better and more profitable resource transfers for family use as well as growth of the business group. Research in finance (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002) also suggests that this type of ownership can lead to managerial entrenchment.
With regard to refocusing strategies, family-owned business groups would likely move toward related constrained diversification or vertical integration when a refocusing opportu- nity presents itself through changes in the institutional environment. For example, Thailand's Central Group, controlled by the Chirathiwat family, refocused operations after the 1997 financial crisis by closing more than 120 subsidiaries and outsourcing many noncore operations (Polsiri & Wiwattanakantang, 2004) .
Proposition 9: Compared to other ownership positions in emerging economies, a business group with a dominant family ownership position is more likely to adopt a narrowly scoped diversification strategy with a highly related group of businesses.
Developmental Financial Institutions
Developmental financial institutions (DFIs), similar to pension fund investors, might also have specific influences given their ownership positions in diversified business groups. For example, the World Bank has a subsidiary DFI called the International Financial Corporation, which has an $8 billion budget to invest in privatization programs (George & Prabhu, 2000) . Countries also have DFIs, which may specialize in financing specific industries (e.g., agriculture) or firm size (e.g., small businesses). For example, the Industrial Development Bank of India has an asset base of $10 billion and offers a broad scope of services to facilitate investment (George & Prabhu, 2000) . These institutions are often "pressure resistant" in the classification proposed by Brickley and colleagues (1988) . Accordingly, they are likely to actively provide suggestions to the management of the business group, which would help the group avoid wealth-destroying strategies, such as tunneling, found to be associated with broader family ownership (Chang, 2003) .
Because DFIs are large block shareholders, they are likely to provide monitoring behaviors similar to active institutional investor shareholders in developed economies (Gillan & Starks, 2003) . David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) suggested that institutional shareholders are often vigilant in guarding against opportunistic managerial and other owner behavior that would result in wealth-destroying tunneling. In general, however, because institutional investors have a diversified portfolio, they would want firms to be more focused Hoskisson & Turk, 1990) , but without the tunneling associated with family ownership (Hargis, 1998) . This would indicate that they would support refocusing leading to reduced levels of diversification for business groups in emerging economies.
Proposition 10: Compared to other ownership positions in emerging economies, a business group with a strong developmental financial institution ownership position is more likely to adopt a narrowly scoped diversification strategy with a moderately related group of businesses.
Foreign Ownership
Large foreign investors would likely be "pressure resistant" as well because they have a unique relationship with the managers of the business group. They may form joint ventures (or equity alliances) with local companies through large block ownership positions, and, therefore, they may closely monitor the venture. Also, because they may have significant under-standing of the business and they do not fear retribution from a client relationship as a bank would, they have both better information and motivation to closely monitor strategic behavior of the business group. For instance, through a merger with International Steel Group, Mittal Steel Company (based in the Netherlands) has become the world's most global steel producer. Mittal has been buying large steel operations in Eastern Europe and in other emerging market countries and consolidating and refocusing the older operations and building more efficient facilities (Reed & Arndt, 2004) . Unlike banks, families, or governments that can control business groups, foreign owners are usually less embedded in the social network of the group. As such, the proportion of ownership controlled by foreign investors would likely have a negative impact on unrelated diversification similar to developmental financial institution ownership.
Accordingly, the refocusing that might be done when an opportunity arises would most likely result in a narrowing of the scope of the firm. However, the impact of foreign ownership in regard to strategy and structure would depend more on the particular strategy desired rather than an emphasis on narrow versus broad levels of diversification. Thus, the incentive would be to generally refocus more narrowly but do it in a way that tends to support the particular strategy of the joint venture. For example, if the joint venture intended to foster vertical relationships as in a buyer-supplier arrangement, then the particular diversification strategy would follow from this strategic intent. If the joint venture was created to produce technologically advanced products, then perhaps a more related and cooperative diversification strategy would likely be pursued.
Proposition 11: Compared to other ownership positions in emerging economies, a business group with a strong foreign ownership position is more likely to adopt a narrowly scoped diversification strategy with a moderately related group of businesses.
Bank Ownership
Compared to family, DFI, and foreign ownership, bank ownership might provide an incentive for diversified business groups to refocus their portfolio of businesses in a different manner. In a group with a strong bank ownership position, the focal bank may provide and facilitate resource allocation among group member firms. Although such banks may provide help and support during times of financial distress (Aoki, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1990) , Brickley and colleagues (1988) classified banks and banking companies as "pressuresensitive investors." This is due to the relationship they have with firms in which they may also invest. In large part, they are dependent on these firms for their income and the interest they derive off loans provided to client corporations. They also receive fees by providing services to customer firms. Often banks are associated with large diversified networks as well and may even be partially owned by a business group (Hoskisson et al., 2001) . In emerging economies, such banks may be closely associated or partly owned by the families connected with these business groups. Such banks may also be closely associated with the government and may not have experienced significant competition in the banking environment.
Because the largest firms in emerging economies tend to be associated with business groups, banks may gravitate to establishing client relationships with these large diversified business groups (Ramaswamy et al., 2002) . Connection to these large business groups allows a bank to increase its portfolio in which to receive interest from loans and fees for services provided. Business with diversified business groups reduces transaction costs and facilitates relationship-type banking. Accordingly, if there is significant bank ownership in large diversified business groups, it is likely that refocusing would result in more unrelated-type strategies (Ramaswamy, Li, & Petitt, 2004) . In turn, unrelated diversification would broaden the number of businesses through which a bank might create business. At the very least, banks would be less likely to either pressure large client business groups to sell off businesses or encourage them to refocus their operations.
Proposition 12: Compared to other ownership positions in emerging economies, a business group with a strong bank ownership position is more likely to adopt a broadly scoped diversification strategy with a mix of related and unrelated (related-linked) groups of businesses.
Government Ownership
Although bank ownership is expected to be associated with refocusing that maintains high levels of unrelated diversification, the association between government ownership in a privatized business group and refocusing favoring unrelated diversification may be even higher. Andrews and Dowling (1998) suggested that the government seldom tracks the performance of firms in which the government has a substantial ownership position. Ramaswamy and colleagues (2002) found that government ownership did not have an influence on Indian business groups and thus concluded that the government might be classified as a pressureindeterminate investor (Brickley et al., 1988) . Thus, government ownership may lower monitoring intensity, resulting in a diversification pattern that is more haphazard and unrelated.
However, business groups in some countries might have political motives for consciously favoring unrelated diversification. For instance, Chinese business groups that are newly formed and have significant government ownership might pursue unrelated diversification and avoid refocusing in order to employ as many individuals as possible (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) . Employment in most previously centrally planned economies is associated with social welfare issues such as housing, medical benefits, and even educational opportunities. Refocusing often reduces head count, and business groups that have significant government ownership and large employee bases might be politically motivated to pursue the objective of maintaining low unemployment versus pursuing other types of refocusing (Hoskisson, Yiu, Bruton, & White, 2004) . Thus, groups controlled by the government (whether it be local or central government) are likely to have sizable diversified operations and resist refocusing efforts that would reduce employment levels (Hoskisson et al., 2001 ). However, as institutions change in an economy such as China, other ownership influences, especially foreign investment and mutual fund investment, might reduce the emphasis on unrelated diversification.
Conclusion
As described in this article, refocusing in emerging economy business groups is likely to reduce the overall level of diversification in such groups, given the movement toward increased market-oriented institutions in emerging economies. An important question for future research is to address whether the business group organizational form will disappear as economic development continues. As noted in the introduction, business groups continue to exist even in developed economies. Perhaps, as the Tata Group in India, business groups will adapt through refocusing to meet new environmental circumstances (Kripalani, 2004) . In developed economies, "institutional voids" may continue to exist allowing business groups to serve an appropriate function (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) . The path dependence of institutional development may also create differences among countries such that business groups continue to survive. Collin (1998) and Gerlach (1997) argued that business groups continue to exist in Sweden and Japan because of distinctive political, cultural, and sociological differences in these countries.
It is hoped that this review will provide a foundation for research on the refocusing of diversified business groups as these groups seek to develop more efficient strategies and structures that are matched to the institutional environment of their countries of origin. Future research is needed to not only understand the overall external and internal organization costs and the effects of various ownership arrangements but also to better understand the idiosyncratic external and internal organizational issues that may foster or hinder refocusing activities and the strategic direction that refocusing takes. Although we have offered a number of important factors that might be considered in future research, there may be others that will emerge as research proceeds. Note 1. Corporate restructuring as defined here from the point of the view of the strategy literature is focused on portfolio reorganization and has little to do with actual changes in organizational structure. Although we talk about changes in organization structure, they are associated with changes necessary to implement a particular type of diversification strategy (related versus unrelated). For more on the specific structure types discussed in our article, see Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim (1993) .
